

Top Secret 219

(Security Classification)

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	HK		
2			
3			
4			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE

CONTROL NO.

25X1

25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Monday August 8, 1977

CG NIDC 77-183C

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

25X1

(Security Classification)

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 8 August 1977

25X1

25X1

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

USSR-SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Report Page 1

25X1

FRANCE: Left Common Program Page 7

UK: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Page 9

USSR: Energy Production Slows Down Page 10

25X1

BRIEFS Page 12

25X1


Iran

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

USSR-SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Report



[REDACTED] Soviet Ambassador to Somalia Samsonov told a US official late last week that the USSR, in accordance with previous agreements, is continuing to supply Somalia with arms and had not reduced the number of military advisers in Somalia.

[REDACTED] The Soviet ambassador admitted that Soviet support for Ethiopia and the undeclared war in the Ogaden are causing problems for the USSR in its dealings with Somalia. The Somalis, said Samsonov, see the Ethiopian revolution as more tribal than Marxist while the Soviets think it is a victory for socialism in an important part of Africa. The Soviet ambassador stressed that the USSR would continue to support the regime of Chairman Mengistu in Ethiopia for this reason.

[REDACTED] Samsonov asserted that Somali-Soviet relations, for the most part, are on track. He noted that social, political and cultural exchanges and collaboration between Somalia and the USSR are continuing without interruption. The ambassador emphasized that Somalia is a socialist country and, in an obvious reference to recent Saudi Arabian aid credits to the Somalis, Arab money would not change this.

[REDACTED] The ambassador denied knowing of any recent Soviet attempts to mediate the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. He was pessimistic about the chances of any such mediation efforts, however, arguing that the Ethiopians are as determined to

save the Ogaden as the Somalis are to take it. He further denied that the Soviets could bring any real pressure on the Somalis to stop their actions in the Ogaden.

25X1 [] In general, Samsonov's remarks betray a growing Soviet recognition of their predicament in the Horn of Africa. Although apparently aware that continued support for Mengistu could lead to a rupture in Somali-Soviet relations, the Soviets nonetheless appear to be taking comfort in Somalia's commitment to socialism and, more important, its dependence on the USSR. In the meantime, Moscow is continuing its attempts to mediate the conflict.

25X1 []

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

FRANCE: Left Common Program

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Socialist leader Mitterrand, in two recent interviews, tried to strike a balance between the demands of Socialist ideology and responsible pragmatism. He noted that, although the Socialists would never go back on their decision eventually to renounce nuclear weapons, the nuclear force should be kept in its present state until multilateral disarmament arrangements render it unnecessary. In a suggestion that many viewed as a sign of indecisiveness, he proposed that the French people make the final decision on the nuclear force, probably in a referendum.

25X1

[redacted] The proposal was immediately denounced as unconstitutional by both President Giscard and Communist leader Marchais, who also accused Mitterrand of "weakening the left" by his proposal. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1

[redacted] In an oblique reference to NATO, he expressed doubt about the deterrent value of a nuclear force independent of "other arrangements." Defense autonomy based solely on the nuclear deterrent would result, Mitterrand said, in a "nuclear Maginot line."

25X1

[redacted] Although the Communists pay lip service to French presence in the Atlantic alliance, many Socialists are convinced that Communist demands for an independent nuclear force and an "omnidirectional" defense posture are motivated by an essentially neutralist attitude designed to pull France out of the Alliance; Mitterrand and most Socialists are committed to the Alliance.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

25X1 [] Despite Communist pressures, Mitterrand has evidently decided that his party will not definitely resolve its position on the nuclear defense issue until December 11 at a special Socialist convention on defense. Mitterrand's views probably will prevail at the convention, although he will be opposed by a significant minority of Socialists who argue that the nuclear force is immoral, ineffective, and not in the pacifist tradition of Socialism.

25X1 [] Mitterrand also probably will be able to impose most of his defense views on the Communists. Some of their demands--such as a defense strategy not aimed only at the East and a "collegial" responsibility for the use of the nuclear strike force--are clearly bargaining chips and probably will be dropped.



UK: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

[redacted] //British authorities are conducting public hearings on a proposed nuclear fuel reprocessing facility on the northwest coast of England. The matter has become a major test involving energy policy, civil rights, and environmental politics, as well as foreign exchange earnings.//

[redacted] //The hearings, which will last at least until mid-October, will consider local, national, and international implications of the planned construction. The final decision on the plant, however, rests with the secretary of state for the environment.//

[redacted] //British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. submitted its application at the end of last year. The local county council approved plans for expanding the existing plant at Windscale, which reprocesses natural uranium fuel from British reactors, and for developing an encapsulating technique to store nuclear wastes. Under pressure from numerous special interest groups, however, the council called a public inquiry into the application to build a new oxide reprocessing plant at the site.//

[redacted] //This plant is designed to handle 1,200 tons per year of spent fuel from reactors using enriched uranium. About half the capacity of the plant, which is scheduled for completion in the late 1980s, would be used to reprocess spent fuel from Britain's advanced gas-cooled reactors. The other half would reprocess fuel from other countries.//

[redacted] //The nuclear firm stands to earn more than \$1 billion from reprocessing spent fuels from foreign countries if the plant goes into operation. The company has already negotiated a tentative \$700-million contract to reprocess 1,640 tons of spent fuel from Japan during the 1980s. The Japanese have agreed to the British request for an advance payment of \$260 million, enough to cover more than a quarter of the new facility's development costs.//

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

25X1

[] //The broad and well-organized opposition to the plant includes members of Parliament, scientists, environmentalists, and even the British Council of Churches. The opponents argue that:

--Reprocessing of spent fuels is not necessary.

--The plant would be uneconomic.

--Plutonium separation would encourage nuclear proliferation.

--Inadequate provision is made for disposal of highly radioactive waste.//

25X1

[] //British Nuclear Fuels has cleared the first major hurdle in its efforts to expand the Windscale facilities. During the first seven weeks of the inquiry the firm presented its case. The opposition was unable to make any substantial points although it did successfully attack the company's safety record.//

25X1

[] //The judge leading the inquiry has shown displeasure with the opposition's inability to substantiate some of its claims, which probably has damaged the opposition's credibility. The opposition will present its case late this month. []

25X1

USSR: Energy Production Slows Down

25X1

[] *Soviet production of energy from major fossil fuels rose 4.7 percent in the first six months of this year, somewhat less than the 6.2-percent growth rate achieved during the first halves of 1975 and 1976. Crude oil production is 5.2 percent above the first half of 1976, but is running about 1 to 2 million tons behind the rate required to meet the annual plan. Natural gas output is rising faster than planned and is likely to exceed its target by 4 to 6 billion cubic meters. Coal production grew by only one half the planned rate and may fall short of the 1977 target by as much as 10 million tons.*

25X1

25X1

25X1

[] Almost all of the increase in oil production is coming from West Siberia. Output in Central Asia and in some of the older producing regions--Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and North Caucasus--is falling and is a major cause of the overall slower growth rate. Much of this year's success depends on the continued growth in output from the Samotlor field in West Siberia.

25X1

[] The Soviet gas industry, on the other hand, achieved a record performance during the first half of 1977, with output rising 8 percent compared to the 6.5 percent planned rate. Barring unforeseen setbacks, production this year will reach 346 to 348 billion cubic meters, slightly above the planned goal. If the strong performance of 1976 and 1977 continues, the USSR could come close to reaching its production goal of 435 billion cubic meters in 1980.

25X1

[] Starting in 1978, most additions to gas production will have to come from the giant Urengoy field and smaller neighboring fields in northern Tyumen Oblast. Reserves in the area are plentiful, but recent reports indicate that serious supply bottlenecks and construction delays are hampering Urengoy's development and could lead to slower-than-planned production growth.

25X1

[] Coal production increased only 1.5 percent during the first six months of this year. The two largest producing basins, the Donetsk and Kuznetsk, were reported to be behind in deliveries, and output at several other locations was apparently below potential. This poor performance was attributed in Soviet publications to various managerial problems. No mention has been made of the difficult geological conditions or shortages of rail cars that hampered the industry last year. []

25X1

25X1

[]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2




Iran

[redacted] Jamshid Amouzegar, formerly Iran's minister of state and principal international petroleum negotiator, was appointed prime minister yesterday to succeed Amir Abass Hoveyda, who had held the post since 1965. Hoveyda has been appointed minister of court.

[redacted] Hoveyda's departure had been widely rumored in Tehran for years but has intensified in recent weeks. His removal was probably intended to mute serious public complaints about chronic electric power and commodity shortages.

[redacted] The Shah, who ordered the change of prime ministers, remains in full control of Iran's foreign and domestic policies. The appointment of the US-educated Amouzegar, who has headed the nation's only political party since last October, does not presage any basic change in Iran's national and international policy. [redacted]



Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/03/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2
(Security Classification)